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I. Introduction  
As various commentators have noted, Kant was engaged in a lifelong struggle to achieve 
what he calls in the 1756 Physical Monadology a “marriage” of metaphysics and geometry 
(1:475).1 On one hand, this involved showing that metaphysics and geometry are 
complementary, despite the seemingly irreconcilable conflicts between these disciplines and 
between their respective advocates, the Leibnizian-Wolffians and the Newtonians. On the other 
hand, it involved defining the terms of their union, which meant among other things, articulating 
their respective roles in grounding Newtonian natural science, whose crowning achievement was 
the inverse-square law of gravitation. While Kant changed his mind between the pre-Critical and 
Critical periods about the nature of metaphysics and geometry, he continued to believe in the 
importance of showing that and how, despite their substantial differences, they could be unified.  
Michael Friedman has argued that the Prolegomena can be fruitfully read in light of this 
lifelong struggle.2 I agree. In this paper, I consider how, generally, Kant’s project of marrying 
metaphysics and geometry evolves from the pre-Critical to the Critical period and how, 
specifically, key discussions in the Prolegomena are related to the Critical marriage project. At 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., Friedman (1992), Schönfeld (2000), and Holden (2004). 
2 Friedman (1992, 298ff.). Despite our agreement on this point, our interpretations differ in substantive ways (some 
of which are highlighted in section 5).  
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the same time, I highlight the similarities and differences between the account of the marriage 
contained in the Prolegomena  and the account given in other texts. My interpretation has 
implications for some key, contested points in Kant’s philosophy of science, including the role 
that Kant sees for geometric construction in the grounding of some specific causal laws (like the 
inverse-square law of gravitation), and relatedly, the service Kant sees geometric construction as 
playing in the “special metaphysics of nature” of the 1786 Metaphysical Foundations of Natural 
Science.  
I begin in §2 with a general account of the marriage project in the pre-Critical period. In 
§3, I lay the groundwork for my interpretation of the account of the marriage in the Prolegomena 
by first presenting Kant’s Critical reconceptualization of metaphysics and geometry and then 
explaining what an account of their marriage entails in the context of the Critical philosophy. In 
§4, I show how the marriage issue is connected to Prolegomena’s search for a “common origin” 
of pure mathematics and pure natural science. In §5, I consider the implications of the 
Prolegomena for the role of geometric construction in natural philosophy (including its bearing 
on specific causal laws). In §6, I consider some ways in which geometry and metaphysics serve 
one another. In §7, I conclude.  
 
II. The Pre-Critical Marriage Project 
Kant’s interest in the relationship between geometry and metaphysics is evident in a 
number of pre-Critical works. I will here focus on only those texts and discussions that I take to 
be particularly relevant for understanding the account of that relationship in the Prolegomena, 
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noting in parentheses key points that show up again in the Prolegomena (and which I will 
explore further in later sections). 
As the full title indicates, Kant’s 1756 The Employment in Natural Philosophy of 
Metaphysics combined with Geometry, of which Sample I contains the Physical Monadology 
attempts to show that and how geometry and metaphysics are to be combined in the pursuit of a 
broadly Newtonian natural philosophy. That they could be combined was not obvious, in part 
because the foremost advocates of “metaphysics,” the Leibnizian-Wolffians, took its results to be 
at odds in various ways with geometry. A key example was the infinite divisibility of space, 
which it was generally believed could be geometrically demonstrated. The Leibnizian-Wolffians 
posited indivisible simple substances (monads) as in some sense the foundation of all matter.3 
The Wolffians among them took this to mean that matter and physical space (the space filled by 
matter and its parts) is only divisible to the point where one reaches the monads from whose 
aggregation they arise.4 While they admitted that geometric space was infinitely divisible, they 
took this space to be imaginary and distinct from physical space. They thus abandoned what 
Kant would call the “objective validity of geometry” in the face of metaphysical considerations 
about substances.  
As Kant understands them, the Leibnizian-Wolffians also took metaphysics to be at odds 
in other ways with “geometry,” as advocated by the Newtonians: they differ not just on the 
existence of monads, but also on the ontological status of space, the existence of empty space, 
                                                          
3 For helpful discussion of the arguments of Leibniz and the Wolffians for monads, see Watkins (2006). For 
background on the debate between the Leibnizian-Wolffians and Newtonians and its cultural significance, see 
Friedman (1992) and Schönfeld (2000). 
4 One needs to distinguish between Leibniz’s view and that of Wolff and his followers. Leibniz is committed to 
monads and to the infinite divisibility of bodies (see [Levey 1998]). It is worth noting, though, that Leibniz arguably 
shares with the Wolffians a (from Kant’s standpoint) problematic commitment to a disconnect between the space of 
geometry (which Leibniz regards as a continuum) and reality (which Leibniz takes to consist of discrete parts).  
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and the possibility of action-at-a-distance.5 It is in light of these apparently insuperable 
difficulties that Kant in the Physical Monadology likens a marriage of geometry and metaphysics 
to a mating of griffins and horses:  
Metaphysics, therefore, which many say may be properly absent from physics is, in fact,  
its  only  support;  it  alone  provides  illumination. For bodies  consist  of  parts; it  is 
certainly  of  no little  importance  that  it  be clearly  established  of which  parts,  and  in  
what  way  they  are  combined together, and  whether  they fill space merely by the co-
presence  of their primitive parts or by the reciprocal conflict of their forces. But how, in 
this business, can metaphysics be married to geometry, when it seems easier to mate 
griffins with horses  than  to  unite  transcendental philosophy  with geometry?  For the 
former  peremptorily  denies that space is infinitely divisible, while the latter, with its 
usual certainty, asserts that it is infinitely divisible. Geometry contends that empty space 
is necessary for free motion, while metaphysics  hisses the idea off the stage. Geometry  
holds universal  attraction or gravitation to be hardly explicable by mechanical causes but 
shows that it derives from the forces which are inherent in bodies at rest and which act at 
a distance, whereas metaphysics dismisses the notion as an empty delusion of the 
imagination. (1:475-6) 
In contrast to some who would abandon all metaphysics, understood as, among other things, an 
investigation of the fundamental nature and constituents of bodies and the basis of physical laws, 
Kant maintains that it is “the only support” of physics (4:175). Defying the apparent absurdity of 
marrying metaphysics and geometry, Kant struggles to unify them in the Physical Monadology.  
His first step, I take it, is to show that apparent incompatibilities are merely apparent. To 
do this, Kant provides a revised monadology, according to which matter has its foundation in 
“physical monads” endowed with both repulsive and attractive force. Physical space, which Kant 
sees as arising out of the interaction of monads, is infinitely divisible, something which can be 
established by geometric proof (1:478-9). But Kant argues that this does not entail the divisibility 
of the monads themselves that are the elements of matter and physical space. Physical space is 
                                                          
5 Kant sees the Newtonians/geometers as rejecting monads and as accepting absolute space, empty space, and 
gravitational action-at-a-distance. This last point reveals that by the “geometers” Kant is evidently thinking not so 
much of Newton, who was famously diffident on the issue of action at a distance, but of some of his followers, like 
John Keill, who were not.  
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infinitely divisible insofar as the dynamic relations between them are infinitely divisible, but the 
relata that stand in these relations, the monads themselves, are not divisible. Put differently, a 
monad’s “sphere of activity” (which constitutes the physical space it fills) is infinitely divisible, 
but the monad itself is not (1:480-482). In this way, Kant maintains that matter is ultimately 
composed of indivisible monads (something he thinks is required by metaphysics) while also 
upholding, at least in this instance, the non-fictional nature of geometric knowledge – its direct 
bearing on physical space and matter.6 (The Critical Kant will go on to revisit his earlier solution 
in the Prolegomena [4:288].)7  
While the Physical Monadology’s first step is to show that metaphysics and geometry are 
not irreconcilable, the second step is to show how they should function together in natural 
philosophy – something which has received less attention than Kant’s approach to the divisibility 
problem. Kant turns to this second step in the scholium to proposition 10, upon concluding his 
argument that for matter to fill a determinate volume the monads that constitute it have to be 
endowed with attractive and repulsive force. The scholium considers the question of the 
mathematical laws governing the diffusion of the forces. Kant offers what appear to be geometric 
proofs that attractive force diffuses in accordance with an inverse-square law while repulsive 
force does so in accordance with an inverse-cube law. To focus on the former, the idea is that the 
intensity of attraction will decrease inversely with the square of the distance to a center of force 
because attractive force is dispersed uniformly across the surfaces of concentric spheres (whose 
surface areas are directly proportional to the square of their radii) (1:484). The derivation is of 
particular interest for what it suggests about the division of labor between metaphysics and 
                                                          
6 For further discussion, see Friedman (1992), Schönfeld (2000), and Watkins (2006).   
7 He also alludes to his earlier solution in the Second Antinomy of the first Critique (at 4:441/B469) and explicitly 
critiques it in the Metaphysical Foundations (4:504-5).  
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geometry: the former shows various fundamental forces to exist and to be essential to matter, 
while (among other things) the latter explains – at least partly – why the mathematical character 
of their force laws is just so and not otherwise. (This geometric derivation shows up again in the 
Prolegomena [4:321].8)  
The Physical Monadology does not provide a complete account of the relationship 
between geometry and metaphysics. While it removes some impediments to the marriage – 
including the issue of infinite divisibility, and while Kant clearly expects that geometry and 
metaphysics will always be in agreement, he does not explain why they will always be. That is, 
he does not explain why laws and forces of matter (the object of physics as well as metaphysics) 
must always complement the laws and properties of geometric objects. Indeed, he does not 
explain why either kind of object exhibits laws at all, much less the sorts of harmonious, fruitful 
laws he takes there to be in both domains.  
Along with various other goals, I think the 1763 Only Possible Argument (henceforth 
OPA) tries to fill in these explanatory gaps, thereby providing a more complete account of the 
marriage of geometry and metaphysics.9 The need for a kind of guarantee of compatibility was 
especially pressing for Kant at this time as, in other work from the period (especially the 1764 
Inquiry), he emphasizes the substantial methodological differences between geometry and 
metaphysics. He is insistent that metaphysics cannot be carried out more geometrico, and that 
mathematics cannot be pursued in a metaphysical manner. So why should one think they will 
always deliver consistent, complementary, convenient results regarding the physical world? 
                                                          
8 It also occurs in the Metaphysical Foundations (4:519ff.). 
9 Other commentators have not, to my knowledge, explicitly connected the OPA to the marriage project laid out in 
the Physical Monadology.  
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In the first part of the OPA, Kant argues a priori that God must exist in order to ground 
the possibility of things. In the second part, which has received less attention,10 he points to the 
extensive harmony, beauty, and fruitfulness evident in the realms of both geometry and matter to 
provide a posteriori confirmation of his a priori argument. It is here that Kant can be seen as 
trying to advance the marriage project of the Physical Monadology.  
In the case of geometry, Kant enthuses that a “seemingly straightforward and simple 
thing such as a circle” contains a “wondrous unity of the manifold subject to such fruitful rules” 
(2:94). One of his examples is Proposition 35 of Book Three of Euclid’s Elements: the rectangles 
formed by the intersecting chords of a circle are equal (2:94).11 (The same proposition shows up 
again in the Prolegomena [4:320].)  One respect in which the geometric rules of circles are 
“fruitful” is that they provide surprisingly simple solutions to what might seem to be complex 
physical problems. Here’s one of Kant’s examples: “Inclined surfaces of varying gradients are to 
be constructed, with the inclined surfaces of such a length that bodies freely rolling down them 
shall all take the same time to reach the bottom.” Kant notes that the solution is contained, as if 
by design, in the circle: “free fall through all the chords that meet at the vertical diameter of the 
circle takes the same time” (2:94). 
                                                          
10 One exception here is Schönfeld (2000). However, he focuses primarily on the question of how to make sense of 
Kant’s apparently offering two distinct arguments for the existence of God. Laywine (1993), (2003), and (2014) is 
another exception. She rightly calls attention to the larger question Kant is asking about why and how geometry 
could be such an effective guide to kinematics. She also notes the overlap between these discussions and 
Prolegomena §38. While I learned much from her treatment, one way we differ is that I think Kant is particularly 
interested in explaining why as a matter of necessity the laws of geometry and physics synch up with each other so 
nicely. I take this to be part of Kant’s larger marriage project. Laywine does not, to my knowledge, link this 
particular discussion to the marriage project in Physical Monadology, and she does not emphasize the explanatory 
role that Kant accords to geometry. Moreover, in describing God’s role in the grounding of the laws of physics and 
geometry, she suggests that Kant thinks God could have made matter with no, or with a very different, geometric 
structure and as subject to other basic laws of motion than those that actually obtain (Laywine 1993, 126-127). By 
contrast, I take Kant in the OPA to be rejecting such contingency.  
11 Friedman (1992, 182) explains it as follows: “If two straight lines intersect one another within a circle at point E, 
and meet the circle at A, C, B, and D respectively, then AE x EC=BE x ED.” Laywine (2014, 721) calls this Kant’s 
“favorite Euclidean theorem”.  
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This is one numerous examples of the beneficial and seemingly purposive alignment 
between geometry and laws of motion. Kant underscores how surprisingly relevant geometric 
properties and laws are not just to discovering what the laws of motion and force in fact are, but 
to explaining (at least partly) why they are as they are. For Kant, the distinctive explanatory 
power of geometry lies in the special character of spatial relations: “Spatial relations can also 
enable us to recognize, from the simplest and most universal principles, the rules of perfection 
present in naturally necessary causal laws, in so far as they depend upon relations” (2:134). Kant 
thinks that geometric considerations about space – specifically what he describes as a “necessary 
equality” inherent in the structure of space – explain at least partly why, for example, nature is 
subject to Maupertuis’ principle of least action, as well as why there is a necessary equality of 
action and reaction (2:134). Though not directly mentioned in the OPA, the geometric derivation 
of the inverse-square law in the Physical Monadology should be considered in this light, as 
another instance of the way that spatial relations can explain – at least partly – the character of 
causal laws (in that case the inverse-square law).  
So far, we have considered the harmony and fruitfulness evident in geometry. In the OPA 
Kant also offers various examples of the way that the laws and forces of matter exhibit these 
same properties. Kant repeatedly points, for example, to the large number of “useful” and 
“harmonious” effects that result from the inverse-square law of gravitation (2:106-7; 2:149; 
2:152). (He does this again in the Prolegomena [4:321]). He argues that such harmony, unity, 
and beauty in geometry and physics, and in their relation to one another, is more remarkable 
insofar as it is necessary rather than contingent. He thinks this can only be explained by the fact 
that the laws and properties of matter and geometry have a common ground of possibility in 
God, whom he regards as the legislator of laws. By tracing these laws and properties back to a 
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common, divine origin, Kant explains why geometric objects and matter admit of necessary 
laws, and why these laws are consistent, complementary, and convenient.12 The fruitful marriage 
between metaphysics and geometry was, Kant believed at the time, made in heaven.  
 
 III. A Marriage on New Terms  
It was not to last, at least not on the terms upon which it was conceived in the pre-Critical 
Period. Various changes in Kant’s philosophy around 1770 and thereafter, such as his acceptance 
of the subjectivity of space and time, and his denial of cognition of things-in-themselves, 
precluded him from holding on to all aspects of the account described above. These changes 
meant, among other things, that Kant could not deal with the divisibility problem in the manner 
that he had previously and that he could not claim theoretical cognition of a common divine 
origin for the laws of matter and geometry. These changes went together with a 
reconceptualization of the nature of metaphysics and geometry. In this section, I lay the 
groundwork for an exploration of the Prolegomena’s account of the marriage by first explaining 
this reconceptualization and then showing what an account of their marriage entails in the 
context of the Critical philosophy.  
3.1 Metaphysics and Geometry in the Prolegomena  
In the preamble to the Prolegomena, Kant touches on the distinction between 
metaphysical cognition and mathematical cognition, referring the reader to the first Critique’s 
                                                          
12 Kant’s account in the OPA assigns a role both to the divine essence (which is the source of all possibility) and to 
God’s will. While one can grant that there would be no laws for the pre-Critical Kant without the existence of things 
(which requires God’s will), I take it that for Kant God’s essence is the more important factor in explaining the 
necessity of laws.  
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Doctrine of Method for a more detailed treatment. Both types of cognition are a priori but that of 
metaphysics “must therefore be denominated pure philosophical cognition; but concerning the 
meaning of this expression I refer to the Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 712 f.” (4:266). By 
contrast, “the essential feature of mathematical cognition, differentiating it from all other a priori 
cognition, is that it must throughout proceed not from concepts, but always and only through the 
construction of concepts (Critique, p.713) (4:272). Mathematical cognition is a matter of 
construction in pure intuition (4:281). To attain geometric cognition, for example, we construct, 
using our pure intuition of space, a particular figure in accordance with a prescribed procedure (a 
“schema”) in such a way that the properties of the constructed figure can be generalized to all 
figures of that type.13 The “pure philosophical cognition” involved in metaphysics is not like 
this: it is “rational cognition from concepts” (A713/B741). The concepts that Kant has foremost 
in mind here are the categories14, and paradigmatic metaphysical judgments are synthetic a priori 
judgments involving the categories like “all that is substance in things persists” (4:272). We 
cannot arrive at cognition of such synthetic judgments through construction in pure intuition.  
In order to understand why that is, and to better understand what is distinctive about the 
method and object of metaphysical cognition, it is helpful to consider Kant’s Critical view of 
metaphysics as a discipline, so far as this can be gleaned from texts like the Architectonic of Pure 
Reason15 section of the Doctrine of Method in the first Critique and the Preface to the 1786 
Metaphysical Foundations.16 This will be further useful as Kant here draws distinctions between 
                                                          
13 For discussion, see Shabel (2012). 
14 See, e.g., 4:260 and 4:472.  
15 In making sense of Kant’s conception of metaphysics of nature, I have found especially helpful Plaass (1965), 
Dahlstrom (1991), and Haag (2012). 
16 Following a number of commentators (such as Friedman [1992], [2012], and [2013]), I take the Prolegomena and 
the Metaphysical Foundations to be in important respects mutually illuminating. As we will see, there is 
considerable overlap between these texts on a number of points, including the marriage issue.  
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types of metaphysics (true vs. deceptive; general vs. special) that are highly relevant for the 
Prolegomena.  
A common theme in the texts mentioned above is that, as Kant says in the Metaphysical 
Foundations, “proper natural science presupposes metaphysics of nature” (4:469).17 The 
metaphysics of nature that Kant envisages as a basis for natural science – what we might think of 
as the “true,” (4:472), non-transcendent metaphysics of nature – is not the traditional dogmatic 
metaphysics that strives after cognition of God, the world as a totality, and the soul. Nor is it the 
underlying disposition of the soul that fuels this pursuit and gives rise to illusions that Kant 
punctures in the Critique’s Transcendental Dialectic and, in abbreviated form, in the Third Part 
of the Prolegomena (which deals with the question, “how is metaphysics in general possible?”). 
Instead, it is a reconstructed, critically purified metaphysics that yields real rather than apparent 
theoretical cognition.18 The “nature” upon which it focuses consists of objects of experience. I 
take it that this is the metaphysics whose future coming as a science is heralded in the full title of 
the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics That Will Be able to Come Forward as Science.19   
Within this true metaphysics, Kant distinguishes a “transcendental” or general part, 
which “treat[s] the laws that make possible the concept of a nature in general, even without 
relation to any determinate object of experience, and thus [is] undetermined with respect to the 
nature of this or that thing in the sensible world” and a special metaphysics (4:469). This latter 
                                                          
17 For other usages of the phrase ‘metaphysics of nature,’ see A841/B869, A845/B873, Axxi, and Bxliii 
18 Some recent commentators who emphasize this distinction are Pollock (2001), Haag (2012), and Mohr (2012).  
19 If, as I suggest below, the metaphysics of nature includes the transcendental part (whose essentials are delivered in 
the Critique) and the special part, why is Kant (as Haag [2012, 258] points out) enlisting the help of his readers in 
the problem of bringing about a scientific metaphysics in the Prolegomena? Relatedly, why in the B-version of the 
Critique (written after Kant had completed to his satisfaction the special part of metaphysics) does he speak of the 
metaphysics of nature as something that he has still not provided (Bxliii)?  The answer has to do with Kant’s view of 
what transcendental philosophy requires to be a science or complete system. Namely, it requires the complete 
analysis of the categories and the systematic assemblage of all the predicables (A81-82/B107-8; 4:366; 4:273-4. 
This is evidently what Kant had not completed by 1788 (or apparently ever). See in this regard Plaass (1965, 18-21, 
67) and Haag (2012, 257-8).  
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“concern[s] itself with a particular nature of this or that kind of things, for which an empirical 
concept is given” (4:469-70). The transcendental part of metaphysics of nature includes the 
categories and the system of categorical principles as presented in the Critique’s Transcendental 
Analytic and recapitulated, in the Second Part of the Prolegomena (which deals with the 
question “how is pure natural science possible?”). These include, of course, the dynamical 
categories (including substance, causation, and mutual interaction) and the principles of 
experience involving them, such as the causal principle, and the principle that substance persists. 
Kant regards these as transcendental laws of nature (A216/B263; 4:307), the most fundamental 
laws of the order of nature, so far as we can experience it. The special metaphysics of nature, by 
contrast, deals with a particular empirical nature, namely that of matter. Drawing on the 
transcendental part of metaphysics, as well as considerations about the mathematization of 
material objects, the “special metaphysics of corporeal nature” tries to determine a priori the 
more specific forces and laws (including laws of mechanics, like the law of inertia and the law of 
the equality of action and reaction) that are specifically necessary to matter as such. These more 
“specific” a priori causal laws of special metaphysics “stand under” the dynamical categories and 
principles, as do other specific empirical causal laws, to use Kant’s phraseology from the B-
Deduction (B165). 
What Kant calls “pure natural science” in Prolegomena §15 corresponds to precisely 
these two parts of the true metaphysics of nature. The completely pure and universal portion of 
pure natural science corresponds to the transcendental/general part; the impure (but still a 
priori)20 portion that involves empirical concepts connected to matter like motion, 
                                                          
20 In the introduction to the B-Critique, Kant distinguishes between two types of a priori judgments: pure and 
impure, where only the latter contain empirical concepts (B3). Evidently, Kant thinks that judgments that contain 
empirical concepts can nevertheless be justified through some non-empirical process and so count as a priori.  
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impenetrability, and inertia corresponds to the special metaphysics of corporeal nature (4:295). 
In much of the Second Part of the Prolegomena, Kant focuses on the possibility of the former. 
However, in Prolegomena §38, he treats a specific law – the inverse-square law of universal 
gravitation – which figures centrally in the special metaphysics of the Metaphysical 
Foundations, and in doing so, descends into the impure part of universal natural science. In 
subsequent sections, I will have more to say about §38.  
Let’s return to the differences between metaphysical cognition and geometrical cognition. 
While both yield genuine synthetic a priori cognition, we do not arrive at cognition of 
metaphysical claims through construction in pure intuition. Instead, Kant thinks we must prove 
them discursively, by means of a transcendental proof. In the case of the transcendental part of 
the metaphysics of nature, I must consider, as Kant says in the Prolegomena §14, “my 
understanding, and the conditions under which alone it can connect things in their existence” 
(4:294). These “synthetic conditions” are the concepts and principles necessary for perceiving 
spatiotemporal objects and experiencing them as connected together in an objective space and 
time. Such principles of the possibility of experience are simultaneously the fundamental 
conditions of nature in general, defined as “the existence of things, insofar as that existence is 
determined by universal laws” (4:294; cf. 4:474). Here again Kant has in mind primarily the 
dynamical categories and dynamical principles.21  
We are now in a position to explain why metaphysics cannot proceed by construction in 
Kant’s technical sense. It cannot since neither the dynamical concepts pertaining to nature in 
general nor the specific dynamical concepts pertaining to corporeal nature can be constructed. 
                                                          
21 See in this regard Friedman (1992, 180ff.)  
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That is, we are unable to construct in pure intuition general concepts like causality, force, or 
substance (A770/B798; A720-2/B748-750), or specific concepts of the attractive and repulsive 
forces characteristic of matter (4:525). More generally, we cannot construct the existence of such 
things in pure intuition but must be given the data for their existence in empirical intuition. In 
contrast to metaphysics, mathematics can proceed by construction in pure intuition because it 
does not concern itself with existence (A719/B747). This is closely related to the fact that the 
objects of pure geometry fall under the mathematical categories but not under dynamical 
categories – they are causally inert (5:366n).22 It is for this reason that, as Kant says in the 
Metaphysical Foundations, “one can attribute only an essence to geometrical figures, but not a 
nature (since in their concept nothing is thought that would express an existence)” (4:467n).23  
3.2. Why an Account of the Marriage is Necessary and What Questions it Needs to 
Answer 
It is with these stark differences in mind that Kant describes judgments of mathematics 
and metaphysics in the Prolegomena as “worlds apart” (4:370-1). Nevertheless, Kant continues 
to think that metaphysics and geometry can and must be combined for the purposes of natural 
philosophy. A remark in the first Critique’s Doctrine of Method is representative: “mathematics 
and philosophy are two entirely different things, although they each offer the other their hand in 
natural science” (A726/B754).24 Moreover, it is clear that Kant takes the marriage between 
                                                          
22 As noted, e.g., by Plaass (1965, 32ff.) 
23 The first sentence of Prolegomena §38 seems to be in conflict with the Metaphysical Foundations on this point. A 
number of explanations of this passage are possible. One is that it reflects a temporary oversight on Kant’s part (this 
seems to be the view of Plaass [1965, 31]). Another is that, as Friedman [1992, 190, 194] argues, Kant is directing 
our attention not to the objects of pure geometry but rather to particular concrete physical instantiations of such 
objects, such as orbits, which as actually existing items do have natures. The explanation I find most plausible is that 
Kant is describing a natural (but deceptive) metaphysical tendency that is fueled by geometry. See Messina (2018).  
24 Though Kant uses the term ‘philosophy’ here rather than ‘metaphysics’, he defines metaphysics as philosophical 
cognition and in various places he indicates that pure philosophy and metaphysics are synonyms (e.g. 4:469).  
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mathematics and metaphysics (understood as the true metaphysics of nature described above) to 
be necessary not just for the existence and progress of natural science but also for their own 
possibility. On the last point, Kant says in the preface to the Metaphysical Foundations that 
special metaphysics is “only possible by means of mathematics” (4:470). At the same time, Kant 
insists that mathematics – particularly geometry – requires metaphysics (evidently 
general/transcendental as well as special) (4:478-9).  
The Critical Kant needs a way to account for this marriage, as he attempted to do in the 
pre-Critical period. This requires answering various questions. First, as he tried to do in the pre-
Critical period (especially in the OPA), Kant needs to explain how it can be that geometry, on the 
one side, and metaphysics and physics, on the other side, will always agree with each other. 
More exactly, he needs to explain how the truths of geometry are able to harmonize with the 
categories and laws of nature (where this includes the transcendental laws of nature as well as the 
other causal laws, such as those of physics, that stand under them). This is a general “how is x 
possible question” – with the x here being the complementary character of geometry and 
metaphysics. Its answer is not obvious because it is not immediately obvious why or how 
geometry, as concerned with the realm of essence, and metaphysics as concerned with nature, 
should be in agreement. It includes, as a specific instance, the question, which had also exercised 
Kant in the pre-Critical period, of how it is possible for the infinite divisibility that is provable in 
geometry to be applicable to physical space, and indeed, how it is simultaneously possible for it 
to be applicable and for there to be substances in space. This question was particularly pressing 
16 
 
for the Critical Kant since his previous, pre-Critical solution was no longer available to him.25 
Call these two question the general and specific “how is complementarity possible?” questions. 
Second, Kant needs to explain what metaphysics and geometry do for each other. As with 
the previous question, we can distinguish both a general version of the question – how generally 
is each necessary for the other – and a specific version of the question regarding their respective 
roles in accounting for specific laws of nature, like the inverse-square law and the laws of 
mechanics. (Call these the general and specific “respective roles” questions.) In the next sections, 
I show how the Prolegomena bears on these questions.  
 
IV. Kant’s Accounts of the Common Origin and the “How is Complementarity Possible?” 
Questions.  
 The first two parts of the Prolegomena are explicitly concerned with the following 
questions: 
 (1) How is pure mathematics possible? (2) How is pure natural science possible?  
Kant answers these questions not just by trying to identify the origin (or ground of possibility) of 
each; he seeks a “common origin” (gemeinschaftlichen Ursprung) (4:280).26 The search for a 
common origin is apparently identical with the “deduction” that Kant describes himself as 
having completed by §40 (4:327). As we will see in this section, there are strong indications that 
                                                          
25 As we will see, one reason it is unavailable to him is that now takes Kant space as a form of intuition to underlie 
physical space. Another reason is that the Critical Kant thinks that it can be proven that substance in space is itself 
infinitely divisible (pace his earlier claim that physical space is infinite divisible but not the substances in space). 
26 Consider in this regard the following remark: “But what obscured the fundamental idea of metaphysics from yet 
another side was that, as a priori cognition, it shows a certain homogeneity with mathematics, to which, as far as a 
priori origin is concerned, it is no doubt related (A844/B872; my emphasis) 
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Kant views finding a common origin for these sciences as important for the same reason that it 
was important in the OPA to search for a common source of geometric laws and laws of nature. 
Namely, Kant is pursuing the common origin of both sciences so that he can answer the general 
and specific “how is complementarity possible?” questions. Indeed, as we will see, at key places, 
Kant’s account(s) of the common origin in the Prolegomena invokes key ideas and examples 
from the Physical Monadology and OPA – sometimes to straightforwardly criticize them, but 
sometimes to re-appropriate them in subtle ways.  
Unsurprisingly, Kant thinks the origin of pure mathematics and pure natural science lies 
in our cognitive faculties. Kant offers in the Prolegomena what might be thought of as an initial, 
oversimplified account of the way the faculties of sensibility and understanding underlie 
geometry and pure natural science, followed by a later, more sophisticated account.27  
According to the oversimplified account, pure mathematical cognition, including 
geometry, is made possible by the fact that we have space and time as our a priori forms of 
sensibility. We can do geometry a priori because it concerns the forms of intuition that make 
experience possible for us. We can be confident that the results will necessarily apply to those 
objects because those objects are mere appearances dependent on our forms of intuition. This 
holds, inter alia, for the infinite divisibility of physical space, which the Wolffians had sacrificed 
on the altar of metaphysics. As Kant writes in Note 1 to Prolegomena §13:  
It will forever remain a remarkable phenomenon in the history of philosophy that there 
was a time when even mathematicians who were at the same time philosophers began to 
doubt, not, indeed, the correctness of their geometric propositions insofar as they related 
merely to space, but the objectivity validity of and application to nature of this concept 
itself and all its geometrical determinations, since they were concerned that a line in 
nature might indeed be composed of physical points, consequently that true space in 
objects might be composed of simple parts, notwithstanding that the space which the 
                                                          
27 The Prolegomena is similar in this regard to the first Critique.   
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geometer holds in thought can by no means be composed of such things. They did not 
realize that this space in thought makes possible physical space, i.e. the extension of 
matter; that is this space is by no means a property of things in themselves but 
representations of our sensory intuition; and that since space as the geometer thinks it is 
precisely the form of sensory intuition which we find in ourselves a priori and which 
contains the ground of the possibility of all outer appearances (with respect to their form), 
these appearances must of necessity and with the greatest precision harmonize with the 
propositions of the geometer…. (4:287-8) 
Because geometry has its basis in the form of outer intuition, and this space “in thought,” 
makes possible physical space, geometry is not imaginary as the Wolffians claim; rather, the 
results of geometry apply directly to physical space, so that if the former is infinitely divisible 
then the latter is as well. In addition to criticizing the Wolffians, Kant is implicitly criticizing his 
earlier position in the Physical Monadology.28 While he had there attempted to maintain that 
geometry applies to physical space, he did not claim that space was a form of intuition and that 
this space in thought made possible physical space. Instead, he there took physical space to be 
the result of dynamic relations among physical monads.  
On the side of pure natural science, Kant’s initial oversimplified account runs as follows. 
The a priori cognition of pure natural science is possible because the categories and principles 
are a priori conditions of the possibility of experience: the categories are forms of the 
understanding, just as space and time are forms of sensibility. The common basis of pure 
mathematics and pure natural science is then this: both have to do with forms of our mind 
(intellectual and sensible, respectively) that make possible experience, and both concern 
appearances rather than things-in-themselves. 
This account is oversimplified in various respects. It is misleading in giving the 
impression that pure mathematics depends purely on sensibility, while pure natural science 
                                                          
28 As noted, e.g., by Lyre (2012, 93-94).  
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depends solely the understanding. In fact, it is Kant’s official view that pure mathematics also 
depends on categories and synthesis, while pure natural science for its part also depends on the 
conditions of sensibility. On this last point, Kant holds that understanding can only prescribe 
laws to nature in conjunction with sensibility, and that the categories have to be defined in 
sensible terms (in particular, in terms of space and time) to apply to nature, per the schematism 
doctrine.29 This is absolutely crucial for a satisfying answer to the question of how space could 
be infinitely divisible and yet allow for substances within it (this is the specific “how is 
complementarity possible?” question). If, for example, one defines a substance in what Kant 
would regard as purely intellectual terms as a simple item – as the Leibnizian-Wolffians do – and 
if from the infinite divisibility of space it can be shown that everything in space is infinitely 
divisible and lacks any simple element (something the Critical Kant thinks can be 
demonstrated30), it would follow that nothing in space is a substance.  
A more sophisticated account of the “common origin” of pure mathematics and pure 
natural science, one that is better suited to answering the general and specific “how is 
complementarity possible?” questions, comes into view in Prolegomena §38. Kant gives two 
examples of laws concerning conic sections, the first of which (Proposition 35 of Book III of 
Euclid’s Elements) he had invoked in the OPA. Kant also references the inverse-square law of 
gravitation, along with the same geometric derivation from properties of concentric spherical 
surfaces that he had earlier presented in Physical Monadology. Throughout his discussion, Kant 
is concerned to emphasize, just as he did in the OPA, the remarkable character of both the 
geometric laws and the inverse-square law. One way they are remarkable is that they involve 
                                                          
29 Consider Kant’s (more careful) formulation in the Appendix to the Prolegomena: “space and time (in combination 
with the pure concepts of the understanding) prescribe their law a priori to all possible experience” (4:375).  
30 See Metaphysical Foundations (4:504-50.  
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surprising patterns among things that might initially seem unrelated to, respectively, conic 
sections and gravitation. (For example, Proposition 35 involves a pattern among the intersecting 
chords of a circle, while the inverse-square law is responsible for the elliptical pattern of orbits.) 
In this way, the laws unify the phenomena. But they are also themselves systematically unified31 
in remarkable ways. Proposition 35 is, as Kant points out, an instance of a more general law 
extending to other types of conic sections, and the inverse-square law has its “sources” in 
geometric laws (4:321). Related to this last point, Kant is calling our attention to a kind of 
harmony between these different types of laws; he is emphasizing just how useful geometry is in 
accounting for specific causal laws.32 Finally, in the closing sentence of the first paragraph Kant 
notes that “No other law of attraction save that of the inverse square of the distances can be 
conceived as suitable for a system of the world” (4:321). The inverse-square law is peculiarly 
suited to systems of the world (solar systems) insofar as it renders them hospitable to our 
purposes.33 The implication of the first paragraph of §38 is that some explanation is required of 
the remarkable unity, harmony, and purposiveness of the laws (something he had also 
emphasized in the OPA, and indeed, with some of the very same examples).34  
But in contrast to the OPA, Kant doesn’t invoke God, at least not directly. Instead, he 
holds that geometry as well as specific causal laws and the dynamical principles that they stand 
under have a common basis in “the understanding and in the way it determines space in 
accordance with the conditions of the synthetic unity towards which its concepts are one and all 
directed” (4:321). Geometry, insofar as it involves geometric schemata (to which Kant is clearly 
                                                          
31 Laywine (2014) places particular emphasis on the systematic character of these laws.  
32 In section 5, I consider how it is supposed to account for them.  
33 In a discussion of geometry in the Critique of Judgement that echoes various points from §38, Kant highlights the 
suitability and purposiveness of geometry itself (5:362ff.). For discussion of this passage, see Fugate (2014).  
34 Laywine (1993), (2003), and (2014) has called attention to the recurrence in the Prolegomena of examples and 
themes – especially regarding systematicity and purposiveness -- from the OPA.  
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alluding in the second paragraph, at 4:321-2), rests on a mathematical synthesis and 
mathematical categories. In fact, Kant had made explicit that geometric judgments stand under 
the mathematical categories and principles earlier at Prolegomena §20 (4:301). But he is now 
calling attention to another important fact. The mathematical synthesis associated with the 
mathematical principles and mathematical categories and the dynamical synthesis associated 
with the dynamical principles and dynamical categories are really two aspects of a single 
procedure for determining space and time so as to make experience possible.35 The concepts 
involved in this procedure, the categories, are “all directed” towards this end (4:321).  
One thing this means is that the categories are limited in their application to space as well 
as time and have to be defined (for purposes of cognition) in terms of them.36 This is absolutely 
crucial for answering the specific “how is complementarity possible?” question. If substance is to 
be defined not in purely intellectual terms as a simple item, but instead in sensible terms – for 
example, as permanently existing thing (as Kant defines it in the Transcendental Analytic), or as 
“the movable in space” (as Kant defines it in the Metaphysical Foundations [4:502-3]) – then it 
is possible to uphold both the geometrically demonstrable claim that physical space is infinitely 
divisible, as well as the metaphysical claim that there are substances in space. 
Another thing it means is that, because the mathematical and dynamical syntheses 
underlying experience are aspects of an integrated cognitive process that makes experience 
possible, geometry will be generally consistent with and complementary of metaphysics and 
physics. The fact that the laws of geometry, transcendental laws, as well as the causal laws that 
                                                          
35 My reading here is influenced by Friedman (1992, 134n, 201ff).  
36 In this regard, I take §38 to be correcting the Schematism Chapter’s misleading impression that the categories can 
be given objective reality just through time (as does, too, the General Note on the System of Principles in the B-
version of the Critique.) In this respect, my reading differs from that of Guyer (2012), which takes the absence of 
considerations connected to the doctrine of schematism to be essential to the Prolegomena’s method.  
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fall under them, have an ultimate common source in the understanding’s determination of space 
and time – in the application of the understanding to sensibility – both explains how they are 
each possible and in principle explains their unity, harmonious interplay, and purposiveness.37 
Kant’s story is the Critical successor to the divine origin story given in the OPA. Where the 
generally complementary character of geometry and metaphysics/physics was earlier explained 
in terms of a common origin in a unitary God, it is now explained in terms of a common origin in 
our seamlessly integrated cognitive faculties.   
 
V. The Specific “Respective Roles” Question 
Prolegomena §38 contains at least a partial account of the manner in which geometry and 
metaphysics function together in natural philosophy, in the grounding of our knowledge of 
specific causal laws (most obviously, the inverse-square law, but implicitly at least some of the 
laws of mechanics as well). That is, it bears on what I called above the specific “respective roles” 
question.  
Let’s consider one sophisticated interpretation of how it does so. According to Friedman, 
Kant is, initial appearances to the contrary, alluding in §38 to the details of Newton’s own 
empirically based “deduction from the phenomena” of the inverse-square law. As described by 
Friedman, this procedure begins with empirical data, namely Kepler’s laws. In subsequent steps, 
it uses geometric considerations involving conic sections as well as the definition of acceleration 
                                                          
37 I will briefly register two worries about this account. First, Kant gives the impression here that the systematicity 
and purposiveness of laws is guaranteed by the understanding operating in tandem with sensibility, whereas 
elsewhere he regards these things as regulative principles dependent on reason and/or reflective judgment. Second, 
Kant leaves unexplained why there happens to be such a seamless fit between our sensibility (with its a priori 
forms)) and the understanding. Kant himself calls attention to this explanatory gap in the Critique of Judgment and 
speculates about a “supersensible ground” for the fitted-ness of the faculties (5:364).  
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to show that any body moving in conic sections and satisfying Kepler’s law of areas with respect 
to a focus of the conic will have an acceleration directed at the focus that is inversely 
proportional to the square of the distance. In further steps, Newton uses his laws of motion to 
show that there is an inverse-square force directed towards the focus in these cases, that it is the 
same as terrestrial gravity, that it is mutual between all bodies, and that it is directly proportional 
to their masses.38  
One possible objection to Friedman’s claim – which he anticipates – is that Kant makes 
no mention of Kepler in §38 and the initial geometric examples are not initially marked as 
related to Newton’s argument. But that is not a fatal problem, since as Friedman and others have 
noted, Newton relies in his deduction of the phenomena on some of those laws of conics that 
Kant mentions.39  
Now, I think it is quite plausible that Kant knew that Newton used geometry in this way 
and approved of this sort of role of geometry in natural science – its application to empirical 
facts so as to discover specific laws, as it were a posteriori.40 What I want to suggest, though, is 
that this a posteriori use of geometry doesn’t exhaust the role that Kant thought geometry can 
and should play in natural science in accounting for specific laws. One place where we see Kant 
assigning an additional role to geometry is in his discussion of the “sources” of the inverse-
square law in the properties of concentric spheres. This is an idea we encountered in the Physical 
Monadology and it also recurs again in the Metaphysical Foundations, where Kant offers it as a 
“perhaps possible construction” of the inverse-square law (4:518ff.). In contrast to Friedman, 
                                                          
38 Friedman (1992, 170, 192) and Friedman (2012, 313) 
39 Friedman (1992, 192); Friedman (2012, 315-316); Laywine (2014, 746).  
40 Though I will note that I am not entirely convinced that Kant meant to call attention to this procedure in §38.  
24 
 
who denies that Kant accepts this as a geometric derivation of the inverse-square law41 I and 
others have argued that Kant does accept it, and that it implies that the law is for him in a sense a 
priori, something strongly suggested by the language of §§36-38.42 
Assuming the latter view is correct, it means that geometry is not just relevant in the 
process of discovering what the laws are but also that geometry also serves to at least partly 
explain (as it were a priori) why certain mathematical laws (having to do with force and motion) 
are as they are. This was the view in the Physical Monadology and the OPA, where Kant claimed 
that geometry and considerations about spatial relations more generally can at least partly 
explain some causal laws. In this context, Kant gave the example of the law of the equality of 
action and reaction (2:134). In fact, there is reason to think that Kant continues to believe in the 
Critical period that construction, and considerations about spatial relations more generally, can 
serve to at least partly explain some of the laws of mechanics. In the Metaphysical Foundations, 
Kant’s proof of the law of the equality of action and reaction crucially involves what he refers to 
as a “construction” (4:546). And in a 1791 letter discussing the Mechanics Chapter of the book, 
he speaks, in language reminiscent of the OPA (2:134), of this law, as well as the law of  inertia, 
as having their “general and sole sufficient ground in character of space, viz., that spatial 
relationships are reciprocal and equal” (11:247).43  For this reason, I think that when Kant speaks 
in the Prolegomena §38 of “laws that the understanding cognizes a priori, and chiefly from 
universal principles of the determination of space,” this includes not just laws of geometry, and 
transcendental laws of nature, but also the inverse-square law, and at least some laws of 
mechanics (4:321). As specific causal laws, the “latter stand” under the transcendental laws of 
                                                          
41 Friedman (1992, 195ff, 204) and Friedman (2013, 222-224). 
42 Warren (2017); Messina (2018); Messina (manuscript). Plaass (1965, 122ff.) seems to regard the law as in 
important respects a priori as well.  
43 For discussion, see Messina (manuscript).   
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nature and to this extent they require general metaphysics. However, the specific mathematical 
content of these laws – why it is this way and no other – admits of at least partial explanation 
through spatial relations via a construction in pure intuition.44  
 
VI. General “Respective Roles” Question  
I will now briefly consider how the Prolegomena bears on the general “respective roles 
question,” leaving it to other occasions to further develop the points in this section. 
The account of the role of space in grounding the laws of motion and the inverse-square 
law that emerged in our consideration of §38 suggests a certain account of how construction is 
necessary for special metaphysics. Namely, it suggests that the forces posited in special 
metaphysics, though they cannot themselves be constructed, have to be such that they allow for 
laws that can be constructed – lest special metaphysics lose its scientific status. As we have seen, 
Kant thinks that such construction partly explains the content of the laws. There are indications 
that Kant also believes that one cannot have a proper science concerning motion and forces in the 
absence of mathematically constructible laws to go along with them.45   
The Prolegomena also has implications for the way that general metaphysics serves 
geometry. One way that it serves geometry is by providing a philosophical account of 
geometry’s applicability to nature. Another way that it does so is by dispelling certain 
metaphysical illusions of the sort that the traditional advocates of geometry (the Newtonians) 
                                                          
44 Admittedly, this leaves open the question of what exactly “standing under” amounts to.  
45 Kant denies that chemistry is as yet a science precisely because it has not yet managed to “construct” a “law of 
approach and withdrawal” and present it a priori in pure intuition (4:470-1). For further discussion see Messina 
(manuscript).   
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have fallen prey to, like absolute space. I have argued elsewhere that Prolegomena §38 contains 
a critique of such a metaphysics of space, while also acknowledging that geometry produces a 
natural temptation for it.46  
In fact, the Metaphysical Foundation suggests that special metaphysics is intended to 
serve geometry (and mathematics more generally) in ways similar to those mentioned. One way 
is by explaining the applicability of mathematics, not to objects of nature in general, but 
specifically to motion and movable objects47, as well as to other key concepts of Newtonian 
physics, like mass.48 Another way it serves geometry is by dispelling further metaphysical 
illusions in matter theory – like the notions of absolute impenetrability and empty space – to 
which the “mathematical-mechanical” natural philosophers (a label that evidently encompasses 
the Newtonians/geometers) are peculiarly subject. Here, again, there are suggestions that 
geometry itself fuels these dubious metaphysical notions (4:524-5; 4:532ff.).  
 
VII. Conclusion  
The Prolegomena is an important chapter in Kant’s lifelong struggle to achieve a 
marriage of metaphysics and geometry. For both the pre-Critical and Critical Kant, this involved 
grappling with (versions of) the “how is complementarity possible?” and “respective roles” 
questions. I have tried to show how the First and Second Parts of the Prolegomena contain at 
least partial answers to these questions. I have tried to show further that Kant’s answers are 
continuous in some respects with his pre-Critical answers and discontinuous in others. One 
                                                          
46 See Messina (2018).  
47 As Dahlstrom (1991, 278) suggests.  
48 Friedman (2013) emphasizes this point.  
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respect in which there is considerable continuity is in the idea that answering the 
complementarity questions requires a “common origin” story. Another respect is in the idea that 
geometric construction (and considerations about spatial relations more generally) provides a 
partial explanation of certain specific a priori laws concerning force and motion.49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
49 I am grateful to Peter Thielke and Eric Watkins for comments on an earlier draft.   
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